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Underlying  Greece's  public  debt  crisis  is  a  fundamental 
economic  problem:  its  lack  of  international  competitiveness. 
While in the short term the debt crisis must be solved, in the 
long term the economic perspective of the country will depend 
on whether it will succeed in developing competitive industries. 
Reducing costs by lowering wages in case Greece stays in the 
eurozone or by devaluing its currency if  it  does not is only a 
short-term  answer.  Increasing  Greek  competitiveness  will 
depend on a farsighted industrial policy targeted on upgrading 
the economy.
The dramatic developments in Greece since the outbreak of its debt crisis make spectators wonder 
whether there is any global solution to the host of problems the country encounters. While there is 
no  panacea  to  cure  all  structural  ills  of  the  Greek  economy,  proposing  solutions  presupposes 
structuring the “Greek crisis” into three seperate ones that should be treated separately:
1. The  Greek  public-debt  crisis:  This  is  the  most  obvious  structural  problem  the  Greek 
economy faces. In theory, this problem would be the easiest to solve if it occured alone and 
if there were no interdependencies: it would then suffice to reduce public expenditures and 
to increase public revenue. This would be a matter of few years.
2. The Greek government crisis: Greece's public sector is lacking efficiency. This makes it very 
difficult  to solve the debt crisis.  For  example,  increasing taxes will  not  augment  public 
revenues  if  there  is  no  effective  tax  administration  capable  of  collecting  higher  taxes. 
Widespread corruption is another structural problem. To this problem there is no generalized 
solution.  Rather,  for  each  area  of  government  activity  customized  solutions  have  to  be 
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elaborated. This is a matter of at least five to ten years.
3. The Greek competitiveness crisis: Greece is lacking competitiveness. Apart from tourism, 
there are virtually no industries able to sucessfully compete in global markets. Greece's trade 
deficit is a signal of this fact. Quite shockingly, Greece's industrial structure resembles more 
that of a developing country than that of other EU member states. This problem is the most 
long-term one. Solving it will take several decades (Brenke 2012).
Complicating  the  situation  is  the  fact  that  there  are  considerable  interdependencies  between 
approaches to solve the three problems mentioned. For example, lowering wages might be a way to 
improve Greek  competitiveness  in  the  short  term.  This  would not  provide  durable competitive 
advantages for Greek industries but it could pave the way for a long-term upgrading process by 
enabling Greek producers to enter international markets by taking use of their newly attained cost 
advantage.1 However, it would immediately put additional pressure on purchasing power and thus 
reduce Greek government  revenue.  Consequently,  it  would complicate efforts  to solve the debt 
crisis.
As this is the most immiment problem, however, the debt crisis must be solved. In case of Greece 
exiting the euro zone, a similar argument holds. Introducing a new currency would certainly lead to 
devaluation. Greek industry would enjoy a cost advantage but the public debt crisis would become 
even more difficult to solve because the government would find it almost impossible to pay back 
euro-denominated debt. A default would become very likely and cut off Greece from international 
capital markets for a considerable time. Government functions might become even more difficult to 
perform and the second problem, the government crisis, would take even more time and effort to 
resolve.  Unforseeable social  consequences,  including possible social  unrest,  are even more dire 
perspectives in this scenario.
Both situations would strain prospects to upgrade Greek industries' competitiveness. Fiscal stability 
is a necessary,  although not a sufficient condition for economic growth. It does not create growth, 
1 It should be noted that an increasing competitiveness will show in higher exports in competitive industries, but does 
not have to lead to durable trade surpluses. In view of the dangers durable trade imbalances engender and of the fact 
that some countrie's surplus must be some other's deficit (Stiglitz 2007: 264), demanding a durable trade surplus for 
Greece would be imprudent. Increasing exports, however, is important as a proxy for increasing competitiveness. It 
would signal that Greece participated in the efficiency-enhanding and thus wealth-creating process of specialization 
in international trade by concentrating on its newly developing absolute and comparative advantages. Increasing 
imports in other goods where other nations hold absolute or comparative advantages would be the complementary 
aspect of this development that would ensure an equilibrium in foreign trade (Benner 2011a).
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but it is necessary because fiscal instabilities can hamper growth if and when it emerges. Thus, all 
three  problems  must  be  solved  at  once.  This  requires  approaches  that  eliminate  the  trade-off 
between solutions to  the debt and the competitiveness crisis.  As cost  advantages  through wage 
reductions and devaluation complicate solutions to the debt crisis, structural solutions to upgrade 
the economic structure of Greece are required. This holds true both if Greece stays in the eurozone 
and if it exits it. Thus, a modern industrial policy aimed at upgrading the Greek economy with very 
limited public money it needed.
Industrial policy: what is it?2
Definitions of industrial policy in the literature vary widely (e.g. Conrad 1987: 4-5 and 20; von 
Einem 1991: 13; Krumbein 1991: 41; Eichhorn and Greiling 1995: 18; Brösse 1999: 1 and 12-15; 
Bruch-Krumbein und Hochmuth 2000: 59-60; Seitz 2000: 32-34; Aiginger 2007: 300-302 and 319-
320; Meyer-Stamer 2009: 10-12). One open question is whether the term industrial policy refers 
only to manufacturing,  to  the industrial  sector,  or  to the whole economy.  Following the strand 
proposed in the U.S. literature (e.g. Rodrik 2004: 2), in the sense used in this article, industrial 
policy refers to the whole economy.
Following Benner's (2012: 76) definition that is based on von Einem (1991: 13) which centers on 
industrial policy's motivation to affect the structural change of the economy by altering pure market 
results, industrial policy is defined for the purposes followed here 
“as the focused use of measures of different partial policies. It consciently 
aims at influencing the change of the sectoral structure of the economy in 
the long term, either explicitly or implictly, directly or indirectly. It pursues 
the goal of achieving results that cannot be expected at all, not in the same 
form, not to the same degree,  or not at  the same time exclusively under 
market influences” (Benner forthcoming).
Industrial  policy can  focus  either  on  conserving  old  economic  structures.  This  can  be  termed 
“traditional” industrial policy. Alternatively, it can aim at upgrading industries' competitiveness and 
thus constitute a “newer” form along the lines that Eichhorn and Greiling (1995: 18) describe. Then, 
it  is  not  longer  about  holding  back  structural  change  but  about  promoting  and  maybe  even 
accelerating it, as several East Asian newly industrializing economies did  (e.g. Chang 2001; Hirono 
2001; Kang 2001; Wong and Ng 2001). Such a policy resembles those described by Porter (1990), 
2 The section draws on the reasoning developed in Benner (2012) and Benner (forthcoming).
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in contrast to the more traditional “industrial policy” Porter (1998: 248-249) criticizes. It  suits a 
market system much better and has the potential to enhance the efficiency of the economy as a 
whole (which is at least very doubtful for traditional approaches of industrial policy). A modern 
industrial policy aimed at upgrading also presupposes an optimistic “positive sum underlying view 
of  competition,  in  which  productivity  improvements  and  trade  expand  the  market  and  many 
locations  prosper  if  they  can  become  more  productive  and  innovative” (Porter  1998:  249). 
Consequently,  when  using  industrial  policy  to  enhance  the  Greek  economy's  competitiveness, 
“newer” industrial policy is the method of choice.
Economic growth: how to create it?
Before using instruments of industrial policy, one has to develop a clear understanding of how it can 
influence  economic  growth.  In  the  European  political  arena  there  seems  to  be  the  view  that 
economic policy can “create” growth,  e.g. through project funding by the EU's structural policy 
funds.  However,  it  is important  not to overestimate the possible impact of policy.  Impulses for 
economic  growth  do  not  originate  from government  policy,  but  from entrepreneurial  initiative. 
Government's role is to let businesses grow. For this, there has to be a market framework that gives 
them enough freedom to develop and a regulatory environment that exhibits adequate bureaucratic 
and fiscal  rules  instead of  unduly burdensome and excessive ones.  Structural  reforms aimed at 
liberalization to  free  growth  dynamics  may  be  worth  considering  in  a  number  of  European 
economies.  This can include liberalization in the  labour market  or in specifically  regulated  and 
protected markets, a cutback of protectionism in international trade, or the deletion of subsidies that 
distort competition. Functioning and effective governmental structures are another prerequisite for 
economic  growth  to  occur.  This  is  a  matter  of  market  policy  (or  in  the  German  tradition, 
“Ordnungspolitik”).
In addition, however, government can play a role in empowering entrepreneurship.3 It  can create 
impulses for competitivity in the long term in certain industries.  This is what modern industrial 
policy is all about and where, for example, the focus of EU structural policy should lie. Thus, the 
question in industrial policy should not be how government can create growth but rather how it can 
promote it by forstering entrepreneurial initiative.
3 The notion of economic policy empowering businesses follows an idea of Johannes Glückler for which I am 
grateful.
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Upgrading: how to promote it? 
Under the caveat that (industrial) policy can not expected to create but rather (at most) to promote 
growth and that the central role of entrepreneurial initiative should always be considered, there are 
numerous instruments of  a modern,  “newer”  industrial  policy that could be used to rebuild the 
Greek economy by helping it gain competititiveness.
The first competitiveness-enhancing measure that comes to mind is the possibility to lower costs 
mentioned above. Lowering wages is one way to do this, devaluation in the case Greece would exit 
the  euro  area  is  another.  The  problems  associated  with  these  approaches  have  already  been 
discussed. In the context of promoting competitiveness it needs to be emphasized that such cost 
advantages are generally only effective in the short term. They can be very ephemeral if some other 
economy entering global markets has even lower costs. In addition, desired effects of devaluation 
can be threatened by the Dutch disease. Upgrading competitiveness requires moving to stronger 
competitive positions such as those gained and sustained by superior quality. Cost advantages can 
be helpful to initiative an upgrading process, especially for developing countries with structurally 
lower costs  (e.g.  due to abundant  labor)  and lower productivity.   For  Greece as  a  EU member 
country which aims at competing with other EU economies and whose major challenge is to keep 
its  people's  living  standard  in  the  long  term,  upgrading  product  quality  appears  as  a  more 
sustainable way. Still, this is a very long-term process (Porter 1990).
Even for Greece's most significant tourism industry, lowering costs is not a panacea. Concerning the 
low-cost  strategy of  neighboring Turkey and  its  widespread  investments  in  modern  large-scale 
tourist  infrastructure during recent years,  Greece should concentrate  on other  market  segments. 
Competing on a cost basis against Turkey that has a similar landscape and that also comes up with 
coasts on the Mediterranean sea but has strong cost advantages does therefore not appear as a wise 
option for Greek tourism. Instead, putting a stronger emphasis on premium segments of tourism, as 
well as developing ecological, cultural, urban, or health tourism are possible approaches. This might 
also contribute to overcome the strong seasonality in Greek tourism (Brenke 2012: 11).
In order to stimulate high-quality production and services, enhancing competition is an important 
issue.  This requires  deregulation and privatization in  protected industries  (which is  a  matter  of 
market policy) but there are also other, industrial policy instruments to promote competition within 
industries, such as awards or sophisticated public demand (Porter 1990; Benner 2012).
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Promoting new business  formation is  another  long-term approach to  stimulate competition and 
innovativeness  and  to  help  (re-)  build  competitive  industries.  Depending  on  the  industry  and 
technology in question, venture capital, incubators, a legal framework for university researchers to 
commercialize  their  inventions  in  spin-offs,  coaching  and  consulting  for  entrepreneurs  are 
applicable instruments (Benner 2012). Maybe even microloans might play a role, especially in rural 
regions where bank coverage might be weaker than in urban ones. In the long term, introducing and 
strengthening forms of entrepreneurship education could be considered as an additional measure.
Promoting  the  economy's  openness  is  an  essential  aspect  in  fostering  industrial  upgrading. 
Competing in international markets means comparing with state-of-the-art competitors. This does 
not only refer to exporting companies but also to those exclusively competing domestically. They 
should not be protected from imports (Porter 1990).
An open trade policy that disregards the short-term political appeal of protectionism is a first step to 
enable businesses to measure up with sophisticated foreign competitors. Promoting their exports 
with  consulting  services,  with  trade-fair  participation  programs  or  delegation  visits  abroad  are 
further  steps  (Benner  2012).  Programs tailored  after  the  model  of  the  “German Silicon  Valley 
Accelerator” that enable entrepreneurs to spend some time in the global hotbed(s) of their respective 
industry can also be used where appropriate (German Silicon Valley Accelerator Inc. n.d.).
Still,  exporting  and  competing  with  high-quality  imports  is  only  one  aspect  of  international 
openness. Being able to tap into international knowledge stocks and flows is another highly relevant 
issue. Participating in global knowledge  “pipelines” can enable companies to upgrade their own 
knowledge  and  develop  new  one  at  the  global  technological  frontier  (Bathelt,  Malmberg  and 
Maskell 2004). Interestingly, many instruments that promote exports can enable businesses to enter 
these pipelines, too. Thus, participating in global processes of knowledge creation can be seen as a 
by-product (albeit a very important  one)  of export  promotion. In  addition,  however,  knowledge 
pipelines  might  also  be  constructed  by  taking  use  of  nationals  studying  or  working  abroad. 
Promoting migration for the purposes of education, training, and gaining professional experience, 
and later return could be worth considerung, especially in view of Greece's currently high youth 
unemployment. However, this requires strong language skills. Adequate education measures might 
be needed to convey them.
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Aproaches that combine industrial and regional structural policy such as cluster policy (Porter 1998; 
Benner 2012) can also provide starting points to promote growth. Initiatives to strengthen regional 
resilience could also be considered (e.g. Bristow 2010; Dawley, Pike and Tomaney 2010; Simmie 
and  Martin  2010;  Martin  2012).  Where  industries  are  localized,  such  concepts  can  provide  an 
anchor for targeted measures to stimulate their growth. In addition, they (as well as other concepts 
of regional  structural  policy such as  business improvement districts,  city management,  regional 
management  and  the  elaboration  and  implementation  of  regional  development  concepts)  can 
mobilize bottom-up dynamics of economic development which are very important for a sustainable 
upgrading process in the long term. They may also lead to the discovery of new potentials and 
starting  points  of  focused  industrial  policy  intervention.  The  national  level  could  foster  these 
bottom-up dynamics by tying the handout of regional development funds to certain networking or 
cooperation  criteria  in  regional  or  local  development  strategy  formulation  and  implementation. 
Cluster competitions are a popular example for this (Dohse 2000; 2003; 2007). EU structural funds 
could be used in this direction, too, and thus unfold a possibly strong and sustainable systemic 
effect in the respective regions. Such an approach might be complemented by capacity building in 
regional  and  local  organizations  critical  to  strategy formulation  and  implementation,  e.g.  local 
government departments for economic promotion, trade or business associations, or chambers of 
commerce (Benner 2011b; 2012).
Legal frameworks specifically tailored to the needs of several industries (e.g. renewable energies) 
might  enable  them to develop  in  the  first  place.  However,  opening up possibilities  for  private 
investment is something different from public flagship projects. This should be kept in mind. In 
general, it is important that industries to be promoted by industrial policy should not be arbitrarily 
selected, and their choice should particularly not be guided by political considerations. They don't 
need to be “representative” either. What counts is the growth impact industrial policy can have in 
affecting them.
While some thrusts of industrial policy can and often should be devised horizontally (e.g. promoting 
new business formation) or regionally, some others will need to be targeted to specific industries. 
Their selection should pass what Porter (1998) calls a  “market test”. While in practice it may be 
difficult to confirm a case of market failure, industrial policy should not neglect this criterion. If 
some kind of market  failure exists, industries might be barred from unfolding their full growth 
potential. If and when industrial policy can help overcome this flaw with instruments whose costs 
are justified by their benefits to the whole economy and that do not unduly distort market processes, 
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there is a case to deploy them in the respective industries. In industries in which this is not the case, 
instruments of industrial policy should be abandoned or not used in the first place. Of course this 
requires a thorough and continuous analysis of the sectoral economic structure (Benner 2012).
Saving Greece: can it be done?
Several  caveats must be places here.  Using instruments  of  industrial  policy does  not guarantee 
success. If the desired effects occur at all, they should be expected only in the (very) long term. 
Notwithstanding  the  Greek  public-debt  crisis  which  must  be  solved  in  the  short  term,  the 
fundamental problem of the lacking competitiveness of Greek industry must be addressed with a 
very long-term perspective. This can be politically difficult because the results will take time to 
show (if they do so at all). In addition, some measures (e.g. deregulation or privatization) are likely 
to encounter political resistance.
Instruments of industrial policy will only unfold their full potential in stimulating growth if and 
when  the  Greeek  government  crisis  is  resolved.  Instruments  of  (industrial)  policy  require 
functioning  and  effective  structures  of  government.  Thus,  promoting growth  through  industrial 
policy is neither a substitute to fiscal consolidation, nor to building effective government structures. 
Greece's three crises require a three-fold solution. Only then rebuilding Greece's economy becomes 
a realistic perspective.
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